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The first fortnight of May 2019 saw a major escalation in the Chinese–American trade dis-
pute, in which additional tariffs on around 40% of bilateral trade were imposed and the US 
introduced an embargo on the Chinese technology company, Huawei. This new phase in the 
economic conflict between China and the US ends the five month long period of relative 
de-escalation and intensive negotiations on a framework trade agreement, initiated during 
the meeting in December 2018 between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping at the G20 summit in 
Buenos Aires. Unlike during the previous breakdown in the negotiations in May 2018, which 
resulted in a freeze on contacts, both sides have announced their willingness to continue 
the dialogue on the trade deal. However, continued escalation of the dispute (for example, 
over Huawei) is leading to a gradual sharpening of both sides’ rhetoric and a toughening of 
their stances as regards the conditions for recommencing the talks. The present phase of the 
conflict has revealed deep discrepancies in issues of fundamental importance for the future 
of the negotiated deal, including the mechanisms for ensuring its enforcement, in addition 
to the circumstances and dates in which the current punitive tariffs could be lifted. The pro-
longed stalemate in the negotiations may cause the US to resume its tactic involving a gradual 
stepping up of its pressure on China, which in turn will translate into a downturn in the global 
economic situation and Washington’s increased political pressure on its allies as regards their 
cooperation with China.
The stalemate in the talks and the new 
trade limitations
On 10 May, the US hiked its tariffs from 10% 
to 25% on a group of products imported from 
China, worth around US$ 200 billion (around 
40% of its total imports from China). According 
to Donald Trump, this move was a reaction to 
Beijing’s sudden withdrawal from certain pas-
sages of the draft trade deal that had been un-
der negotiation since December 2018. The US 
considers these passages of key importance for 
its interests. The US President claims that the 
absence of progress in the negotiations may 
soon result in a new 25% tariff being imposed 
on those Chinese goods worth around US$ 325 
billion that have so far not been subject to tar-
iffs. Beijing responded to the US’s actions by 
announcing its plan to impose additional tariffs 
on American goods worth around US$ 60 bil-
lion (which is around 40% of China’s imports 
from the US) as from 1 June 2019. It has also 
permitted a minor devaluation of the yuan to 
occur. According to representatives of American 
companies, there has been increased adminis-
trative pressure on their operations in China 
(including inspections and prolonged customs 
procedures).
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On 16 May, Donald Trump decided to black-
list the Chinese tech giant Huawei as one of 
the companies that pose a risk to the US’s na-
tional security. This decision has resulted in 
a ban on the sale of American-made compo-
nents and technology to the Chinese company. 
The US President’s administration had been con-
sidering this move for several months, and its 
current implementation should be associated 
with the present breakdown in trade negotia-
tions. Unlike the tariffs intended to reduce the 
competitiveness of the Chinese industrial sector, 
the bans on the export of American-made com-
ponents and technology (which in many sectors 
are of key importance for the continuity of pro-
duction activities and the provision of services) 
have a considerably more destructive and im-
mediate effect: they disrupt bilateral trade and 
the global supply chains, which is why Trump 
has rarely used them until now1. Some American 
subcontractors were temporarily (for 90 days) 
excluded from the embargo on trading with 
Huawei, which was intended to enable compa-
nies from the US and its allied states to plan the 
related process of reorganisation of their supply 
chains. Shortly after the US announced its de-
cision, the Chinese side started to send signals 
regarding the possibility of a potential response 
in the form of restrictions on the export of the 
so-called rare earth elements (which are neces-
sary for the production of advanced electronics), 
whose main producer is China.
1 One exception involved the introduction in 2018 of 
a similar three-month-long embargo on ZTE, a Chinese 
producer of electronic devices. As a result of the embar-
go, the company experienced a halt in its production 
activities and decided to sign a settlement with the US 
government
The intensification of the trade conflict, which 
has been in place since early May 2019, is hap-
pening in the context of the negotiations on 
a bilateral trade agreement that have been on-
going since December 2018 and are intended to 
regulate the economic relations between Chi-
na and the US in a comprehensive manner. Af-
ter the failure of the talks between Beijing and 
Washington at the end of 2017 and the begin-
ning of 2018, followed by a series of punitive 
tariffs imposed by both sides, covering in total 
around 50% of bilateral trade, Trump suggest-
ed to Beijing in December 2018 that the talks 
should be resumed. The condition formulated by 
the US was that the agreement should include 
both a declaration regarding the purchase of 
American-made products by the Chinese side 
and a mechanism to resolve long-term problems 
that are of key importance to Washington, such 
as trade imbalances, technology theft, China’s 
subsidies for its industries and restrictions on ac-
cess to the Chinese market. Initially, Trump had 
set a deadline of three months for the agreement 
to be negotiated and the absence of any agree-
ment on 1 March 2019 was supposed to result in 
an increase in tariffs on a group of Chinese prod-
ucts worth US$ 200 billion from 10% to 25%. 
Due to the satisfaction both sides expressed 
with the progress in negotiations, the talks were 
extended for another two months. The talks re-
sulted in a draft agreement of around 150 pages 
in length that was briefly presented in the Amer-
ican media. In April 2019, the White House sug-
gested that the negotiations were likely to end 
soon and would be crowned by Xi Jinping’s vis-
it to the US and a meeting with Donald Trump. 
However, according to the American side, on 
3 May the Chinese sent a letter to Washington 
containing amendments to all seven sections of 
the draft document and reducing its volume by 
around 30%. Thus, the tariffs Trump imposed 
on 10 May were a de facto implementation of 
the ultimatum he had set for China in December 
2018 in Buenos Aires and a further escalation of 
the dispute by the US is a direct response to Chi-
na’s about-turn in the negotiations.
Unlike punitive tariffs, the ban on the 
sale of American-made components 
to Huawei has a significantly more de-
structive and immediate effect. 
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The main points of contention
The negotiation stalemate that started at the 
beginning of May 2019 has revealed major dis-
crepancies as regards the detailed solutions 
proposed in the future trade deal between Chi-
na and the US. From Washington’s perspective, 
the trade agreement with China needs to con-
tain, aside from China’s commitment to solving 
key problems, certain mechanisms to guaran-
tee its effective implementation. According to 
media reports, the US expects an institutional 
mechanism to be established to monitor the 
progress of the deal’s implementation on an 
ongoing basis and to provide the ability to im-
pose sanctions (new tariffs) when there is no 
such progress. Donald Trump is also pushing 
for the present level of tariffs (covering imports 
from China worth around US$ 250 billion) to be 
maintained until the deal is fully implemented. 
The goal is for China to effectively implement 
the regulations intended, among other things, 
to guarantee equal opportunities in competi-
tion between domestic and foreign companies, 
open up other sectors of the Chinese economy 
to foreign investments, eliminate subsidies, and 
to guarantee that intellectual property rights 
are respected. At a certain stage of the nego-
tiations, information was leaked to the media 
suggesting that the US demanded that Beijing 
should commit itself to refrain from devalu-
ing the yuan (until recently the devaluation of 
the yuan has enabled China to counteract the 
negative effects of the US-imposed tariffs). In 
recent months, the American side announced 
in the media that there are several boundary 
conditions to be met before the deal can be 
signed, including the demands that the deal 
should cover all main fields of economic co-
operation, that mechanisms for verifying the 
commitments should be established and that 
the present tariffs should be maintained for the 
time being. 
Despite introducing its new tariffs in May 
2019 and announcing a further escalation of 
the dispute, Washington initially made sever-
al gestures of goodwill, making it possible for 
Beijing to return to the negotiating table. The 
tariff increase introduced on 10 May will cover 
goods that had not yet crossed China’s customs 
border by that day (which will delay the actual 
introduction of the new tariffs by around three 
weeks for sea freight). Larry Kudlow, the White 
House economic advisor, has also announced 
a likely meeting between Donald Trump and Xi 
Jinping at the G20 summit in Japan on 28–29 
June 2019. There are suggestions from the 
more conciliatory part of the American admin-
istration, as well as in some of Trump’s tweets, 
that this meeting may break the deadlock 
in the negotiations. However, it may also be 
a move intended to mitigate the negative re-
percussions on the financial markets caused 
by a sudden turn in the negotiations. Opinions 
have been aired in both within the adminis-
tration and in the media that the divergences 
between the two sides are too far-reaching, 
which is intended to suggest that in the com-
ing months any agreement should be ruled out 
and that there is a risk of a new period of es-
calation in the trade war. In his interviews with 
American media, Trump himself expressed his 
satisfaction with the current developments in 
the trade war and announced his intention to 
step up pressure on Beijing if no progress in the 
negotiations is made. 
The Chinese side has officially denied the 
US’s accusations regarding its alleged break-
ing of the negotiations and withdrawal from 
the agreements reached so far, referring to 
the situation as the emergence of “discrepan-
cies” and suggesting that the two sides should 
According to Donald Trump, maintain-
ing these tariffs after the deal is signed 
should guarantee that China will imple-
ment the deal.
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“meet halfway”. In an interview with the Chi-
nese media, Liu He, the chief Chinese negotia-
tor, mentioned three boundary conditions for 
the agreement to be signed. First, the signing 
of the agreement needs to be combined with 
an immediate lifting of the present punitive 
tariffs. Second, the US should formulate “real-
istic” demands as regards the contracts for the 
purchase of American-made goods and make 
sure not to change them “at random” during 
the negotiations. In addition, the Chinese side 
demands that the content of the agreement 
should be “balanced” and should not “compro-
mise China’s national sovereignty and dignity”. 
The final condition should be interpreted as 
China’s attempt to limit US demands regarding 
possible amendments to China’s domestic laws 
and to reduce the mechanisms intended to 
guarantee the deal’s implementation. Accord-
ing to Nikkei, when reducing the volume of the 
draft document at the beginning of May, the 
Chinese delegation allegedly deleted the pas-
sages regarding the legally binding measures 
for introducing changes, which were thought 
to have been interpreted as solutions resem-
bling “unequal treaties” forced on China by the 
colonial states in the 19th century. 
The elite of the Communist Party of China that 
forms the ruling power in Beijing is aware that 
yielding to such far-reaching demands from the 
US would significantly limit the CCP’s ability to 
control the Chinese economy via the sector of 
state-controlled companies, and also weaken 
the economic status of the party apparatus it-
self. Moreover, it may slow down the pace of 
technological development and challenge the 
rising competitiveness of the Chinese economy. 
It is difficult to say whether US demands for-
mulated in this way are indeed intended to un-
dermine the economic foundations of the CCP’s 
rule. What is certain is that this is how Beijing 
interprets them. It seems that in recent months 
Beijing has made a series of tactical concessions 
to create the impression, both in America and 
in the eyes of the public, that negotiations are 
nearing their conclusion. At the same time, 
China was hoping that due to domestic po-
litical problems, increased expectations from 
financial markets and the upcoming electoral 
campaign, Trump would be ready to sign the 
agreement at all costs. Despite the failure of 
this strategy and the US’s retaliatory measures, 
China has decided not to sever the talks and de-
clares its readiness to continue dialogue (Amer-
ican negotiators have been invited to another 
round of negotiations that will take place in 
Beijing). Regardless of this, it has significantly 
boosted its anti-American rhetoric in state-con-
trolled media. In mid-May 2019, Xi Jinping 
paid an official visit to the Chinese province 
of Jiangxi, during which he was accompanied 
by Liu He, China’s chief trade negotiator, and 
other figures. During the trip, Xi Jinping visited 
one of the world’s largest plants for extracting 
rare earth elements. The speech given by the 
general secretary of the Communist Party of 
China contained strong political overtones. In 
his speech, Xi mentioned the need to “launch 
another Long March”2, which was widely in-
terpreted as China getting prepared for an ex-
hausting and drawn out conflict with the US.
2 The Long March is a term used to describe the reloca-
tion in 1934–1935, over a distance of around 9,000 kilo-
metres, of units of China’s Communist party militia that 
set off from Jiangxi during the exhausting fight against 
the government of the nationalist Kuomintang. It is of 
great symbolic significance for the history of the Commu-
nist Party of China and the People’s Republic of China.
According to Beijing, the conditions for-
mulated by the US resemble the “unequal 
treaties” of the 19th century and may un-
dermine the stability of the Communist 
Party’s rule in China.
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The economic consequences of the new 
trade limitations
The short-term economic consequences of the 
present escalation of the tariff war have been 
mitigated, due to the positive state of the US 
economy and to Chinese interventions. Fol-
lowing the introduction of the new round of 
tariffs in May, the main American stock market 
indices dropped by around 3% (marking the 
biggest daily falls since the beginning of 2019). 
However, this happened in the context of evi-
dent optimism on financial markets, related to 
a noticeable growth in the US economy. The 
tariff increases introduced on 10 and 13 May 
targeted those sectors that had already been 
affected by the trade war, which will accelerate 
the processes ongoing in those sectors that are 
intended to hit Chinese imports and relocate 
production to countries other than China. The 
introduction of a 25% tariff on the remaining 
portion of imports from China worth US$ 325 
billion may have more serious consequences for 
the American economy because the goods cov-
ered by this tariff include consumer products, 
electronic devices and clothes. The tariff in-
creases may translate into a hike in inflation and 
a drop in the purchasing power of American 
consumers, which in consequence may lead to 
weaker growth. At present, China’s retaliatory 
measures are mainly targeted at the American 
agricultural sector, which boosts the political 
pressure from the sector on the Trump admin-
istration and the Republican Party (Trump in-
tends to counteract this by offering subsidies to 
farmers, for instance). 
On the Chinese side, the new round of tariffs 
caused a temporary drop on its stock markets, 
which has been compensated for by interven-
tions carried out by state-controlled investment 
funds. As a result of the asymmetry in US–China 
trade relations, China is considerably more af-
fected by the trade war – it has contributed to 
a slowdown in the Chinese economy that has 
been ongoing for several months. The Chinese 
leadership’s reaction to the slowdown, includ-
ing, for example, a drop in private consumption 
and in retail sales, involves providing tempo-
rary stimuli to the economy through monetary 
and fiscal policy measures. In Q1 2019, this 
strategy brought relatively positive econom-
ic results and boosted Chinese negotiators’ 
self-confidence. However, the debt of Chinese 
companies, consumers and local governments 
is growing in an unbalanced manner. This 
means that by limiting the short-term effects of 
American economic pressure the Chinese lead-
ership is increasing the cost of any future re-
forms and delaying the necessary transforma-
tion of the Chinese economy. 
In the short term, attempts by both sides to dis-
rupt the other side’s supply chains will have the 
most serious consequences for global trade. 
An example of this is provided by the embargo 
on the export of American-made components 
to Huawei. Shortly after President Trump an-
nounced his decision to impose the embargo, 
several companies cancelled their cooperation 
with Huawei. These included both American 
and foreign companies such as Google, a sup-
plier of software for smartphones and other 
mobile devices, in addition to microprocessor 
manufacturers, e.g. Intel and Qualcomm. Fear-
ing sanctions on the part of the US, several other 
European and Japanese producers of semi-con-
ductors withdrew from their cooperation with 
Huawei, including the German company Infine-
on and the Japanese company Panasonic. The 
statement by ARM, a British producer of pro-
cessors (controlled by Japan-based Softbank), 
announcing the company’s intention to cancel 
its cooperation with Huawei has particular-
ly serious consequences for the Chinese tech 
The escalation of the tariff war is accel-
erating the process of global companies 
relocating their production outside China.
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giant. The Kirin processor architecture which is 
being developed by HiSilicon (Huawei’s daugh-
ter company) is based on technology solutions 
and licences granted by ARM. Although Huawei 
develops its own technologies in software and 
microchip design, one result of Trump’s deci-
sion may be a serious disruption of its supply 
chains, especially in the segment of household 
electronics and smartphones. This challenges 
the future development of the tech giant which 
is of key importance for the competitiveness 
of the Chinese economy and for Beijing’s dig-
ital policy. Possible further use of trade block-
ing tools has been announced by both the 
American side (an extension of the embargo 
to include other companies such as Hikvision, 
a Chinese producer of security systems) and the 
Chinese side (rare earth elements). 
The prospect of further escalation
Although last week there was no formal annul-
ment of the talks between Beijing and Wash-
ington, the prospect for reaching a trade agree-
ment and putting an end to the trade dispute 
has become significantly more distant. It is like-
ly that the two sides will adopt a survival tactic, 
each hoping that the economic crisis will force 
its competitor to be the first to make conces-
sions. Beijing may also hope that a potential 
reshuffle in the US administration will help it 
to sign a deal on its own terms. This attitude 
on the part of China is based on a mistaken 
assumption as regards the mindset of Ameri-
can elites representing the two main political 
parties, who are beginning to view China as 
a global competitor. Even if the deal is signed 
shortly, it should be expected that it will be very 
difficult for the Chinese side to implement. In 
the medium term, this will lead to a renewal of 
the conflict, especially as trade is just one area 
of competition between the two states.
At present, Donald Trump is determined to 
continue to step up pressure on Beijing in the 
field of trade and to impose new tariffs, re-
gardless of their negative consequences for 
the economy. His position is being reinforced 
by upbeat data concerning the American 
economy (in comparison to the EU and China, 
for instance), although the US President seems 
to be making some part of his actions towards 
China conditional on the mood prevailing 
on the US financial markets – during periods 
of stock market downturn a temporary fading 
of the dispute can be expected. The decision 
to impose an embargo on Huawei indicates 
that Trump may repeat the scenario used fol-
lowing the breakdown of the negotiations 
in 2018. At that time, the US resumed talks 
only after it had imposed new sanctions that 
affected the Chinese economy, which was in-
tended to weaken Beijing’s negotiating posi-
tion. However, a quick return to negotiations 
may be prevented by the upcoming US pres-
idential campaign, in which its relationship 
with China will likely become one of the main 
subjects of the electoral campaign. Trump 
may want to avoid getting entangled in the 
talks during the campaign, which could oth-
erwise make him dependent on subsequent 
moves from Beijing. 
The introduction by the US of a new round of 
tariffs in June 2019, and the almost certain 
retaliatory measures on the part of China, 
will have a negative impact on global growth 
prospects and will likely deepen the current 
slowdown in the eurozone (including in Ger-
many). Unable to offer a symmetrical response 
to American tariffs (China’s imports from the 
US are more than four times smaller than its 
exports to the US), Beijing may significantly 
devalue the yuan, thereby undermining the 
competitiveness of its trade partners and en-
couraging other Asian nations to devalue their 
currencies as well. Continued use of tools to 
block the export of components may affect 
European companies that are involved in the 
trade between the US and China as elements 
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of global supply chains. Sudden turnabouts 
in the economic conflict between the world’s 
two largest economies may also destabilise 
global financial markets and trigger a capital 
outflow from emerging markets. 
Trying to force Beijing to make economic con-
cessions, Washington will likely continue to 
build pressure in other fields of cooperation, 
for example, in the military and technolo-
gy sector. It may also want to press its allies 
to limit their cooperation with China, both in 
the bilateral format and within NATO. On the 
other hand, Beijing will likely continue its policy 
of offering limited concessions towards the EU, 
thereby trying to maintain access to the Euro-
pean market and European technology and to 
win supporters in its battle with the US by un-
dermining Euro-Atlantic ties. The aggravation 
of the trade conflict will accelerate the pro-
cess of a decoupling of the Chinese economy 
from the American economy and will result in 
a reorganisation of global value chains, espe-
cially in highly developed economies. In the 
longer run, this represents an opportunity for 
other regions in Asia and – to some degree 
– for Central and Eastern Europe to take over 
a portion of the production activities that 
multinational companies will withdraw from 
China. However, the adjustment period and 
the global economic slowdown that may ac-
company the whole process have a number of 
negative ramifications for the global economy. 
